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Abstract
SNePS is a mature knowledge representation, reason-
ing, and acting system that has long contained a be-
lief revision subsystem, called SNeBR. SNeBR is trig-
gered when an explicit contradiction is introduced into
the SNePS belief space, either because of a user’s new
assertion, or because of a user’s query. SNeBR then
makes the user decide what belief to remove from the
belief space in order to restore consistency, although it
provides information to help the user in making that
decision. We have recently added automatic belief revi-
sion to SNeBR, by which, under certain circumstances,
SNeBR decides by itself which belief to remove, and
then informs the user of the decision and its conse-
quences. We have used the well-known belief revi-
sion integrity constraints as a guide in designing au-
tomatic belief revision, taking into account, however,
that SNePS’s belief space is not deductively closed, and
that it would be infeasible to form the deductive clo-
sure in order to decide what belief to remove. This
paper briefly describes SNeBR both before and after
this revision, discusses how we adapted the integrity
constraints for this purpose, and gives an example of
the new SNeBR in action.
Introduction
Belief revision, or belief change, is the term used to
describe any change in a knowledge base. The form
of belief revision discussed in this paper is removal of
propositions from a knowledge base that is known to
be inconsistent in order to restore consistency. This is
especially important to information fusion, where infor-
mation is combined from multiple sources which might
contradict each other. This paper describes some be-
lief revision theories and the considerations that arose
when they were implemented and added to the existing
belief revision subsystem of a mature knowledge repre-
sentation and reasoning system, SNePS(Shapiro & The
SNePS Implementation Group 1999; Shapiro & Rapa-
port 1992).
These considerations center around the impossibil-
ity of implementing deductive closure and the proper
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weighting of belief revision guidelines. We address the
need to formalize theories that take into account the
fact that deductive closure cannot be guaranteed in a
real-world, need-based, implemented system. We also
explore one technique for following the belief revision
guideline of minimizing damage to the belief space while
retaining the most credible beliefs.
The next section provides the background necessary
to understand the alterations we made to SNePS. In-
cluded are brief descriptions of the following: (a) the
different groups doing belief revision research, (b) the
integrity constraints we intend to implement, (c) SNePS
and its belief revision sub-system, (d) the status of con-
straint adherence before system alterations, and (e) pre-
vious research to improve adherence.
The following two sections discuss the current
changes made to improve adherence and implement au-
tomatic belief revision (autoBR). The latter gives the
user a sense of non-monotonicity, because it is possible
to add a belief to the belief space and, consequently,
lose a previously held belief. However the underly-
ing relevance-style, paraconsistent logic remains mono-
tonic.
The final section contains conclusions and plans for
future work.
Background
Theory vs. Implementation
Belief revision research can be divided into two groups:
Theoretical vs. Implementations. These two groups
differ in the amount of information assumed to be in
a knowledge base. The theoretical researchers develop
postulates about how a knowledge base should react
during revision based upon a number of guidelines.
One of these is the assumption of deductive closure,
which means that everything derivable is contained in
the knowledge base—a deductively closed belief space
(DCBS), which is infinite in size and impossible to im-
plement, although it can be simulated with limitations.
Implemented belief spaces must be finite and of rea-
sonable size, and the reasoning operations performed
on them must be done in a finite and reasonable time.
Beliefs must be added gradually over time and not all
derivable beliefs can be guaranteed to be present in the
knowledge base. We refer to this kind of belief space as
a deductively open belief space, or DOBS(Johnson &
Shapiro 2000). In a DOBS, it is possible for a proposi-
tion to be derivable from the existing belief space with-
out it being present in that belief space. If that propo-
sition is the negation of another proposition derivable
from the belief space, the belief space would be incon-
sistent, but not known to be inconsistent—i.e. the sys-
tem would be unaware of the inconsistency. The nor-
mal meaning of the word consistent cannot, therefore,
be applied to a DOBS. For the purpose of this paper,
however, the term consistent will be used to describe a
belief space or belief set that has no known contradic-
tions (unless otherwise noted).
Even research on finite belief bases still refers to
deductive closure in its determination of consistency
or when considering belief revision postulates (Hans-
son 1993a; Hansson 1993b; Nebel 1989; Alchourro´n &
Makinson 1985). Consistency is determined by the
presence of a contradiction in the implicit beliefs of
a belief base. How can this reliably be implemented?
Even if it can be simulated on a small scale knowledge
base, the theories developed might be suspect if applied
to a very large system. Nebel voiced these concerns as
well (Nebel 1989).
We address the need to formalize theories that take
into account the fact that deductive closure cannot be
guaranteed in a real-world, need-based, implemented
system—even if the system is restricted by something
as simple as the user needing a response within one
minute. These theories need to suggest a belief revision
technique that:
• takes time and complexity limitations into account
• recognizes that adhering to these limitations might
result in revision choices that are poor in hindsight
• catches and corrects these poor choices as efficiently
as possible.
Integrity Constraints for Belief Revision
Ga¨rdenfors and Rott (Ga¨rdenfors & Rott 1995) dis-
cuss postulates for belief revision using a coherence
approach. These postulates, first presented in (Al-
chourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, & Makinson 1985), are based on
four integrity constraints (paraphrased below):
1. a knowledge base should be kept consistent whenever
possible;
2. if a proposition can be derived from the beliefs in the
knowledge base, then it should be included in that
knowledge base;
3. there should be a minimal loss of information during
belief revision;
4. if some beliefs are considered more important or en-
trenched than others, then belief revision should re-
tract the least important ones.
These constraints come from the Theorist group, so
strict adherence to constraints 1 and 2 in an imple-
mented system is impossible. The proper weighting and
combining of constraints 3 and 4 remains an open ques-
tion in belief revision research and a challenge for both
the Theorists and the Implementers.
SNePS and SNeBR Before Alteration
SNePS SNePS is a logic- and network-based knowl-
edge representation, reasoning, and acting system de-
signed to constitute the mind of a natural language
competent cognitive agent. The underlying logic of
SNePS is a monotonic, relevance-style, paraconsistent
logic (Martins & Shapiro 1988). One way that users
can interact with SNePS is through the SNePSLOG
interface—an interface which allows the user to input
propositions in a style that uses “predicate calculus
augmented with SNePS logical connectives” (Mckay &
Martins 1981; Shapiro & The SNePS Implementation
Group 1999)—where propositions are expressed as well-
formed formulas, or wffs.
Propositions added to the knowledge base by the user
are called hypotheses. Propositions derived from those
existing in the belief space are called derived proposi-
tions. The system records a justification for each propo-
sition (whether it is a hypothesis or derived) by associ-
ating it with an origin set consisting of the hypotheses
used in its derivation. An origin set for a belief is a set
of hypotheses which is known to minimally derive that
belief—i.e. no subset of a belief’s origin set is known to
derive that belief.
This is along the style of an ATMS, short for
“assumption-based” truth maintenance system —a
term “introduced by (de Kleer 1984; de Kleer 1986),
although similar ideas had been investigated earlier by
(Martins & Shapiro 1983).” (Martins 1990) also men-
tions that (Sandewall 1967) presented the “first descrip-
tion of as ATMS-like system.”
A hypothesis has a singleton origin set, containing
only itself, but might also be derivable from other hy-
potheses. Multiple derivations of a single proposition
can result in its having multiple origin sets. If the hy-
potheses in a proposition’s origin set are asserted, or
believed, then the proposition is also believed and is
part of the belief space. This situates SNePS firmly on
the foundations side of the coherence/foundations be-
lief revision divide, but a coherence approach can be
simulated by additionally asserting each derived belief
as a hypothesis.
In the SNePS terminology, the belief space is the set
of believed propositions—both hypotheses and derived
beliefs—which are supported by the current context.
The current context is, intensionally, a named struc-
ture that contains a set of hypotheses. That set is the
extensional context. When a new hypothesis is added,
the intensional context now contains a different exten-
sional set of hypotheses. When we refer to adding and
removing hypotheses from “the context”, we are refer-
ring to the intensional context.
Unlike theoretical knowledge bases, implemented
ones cannot promise deductive closure for a knowledge
base, because of the space and time limitations of the
real world. SNePS attempts to derive propositions as
they are asked for—either by the user or by the system
as it performs backward chaining or forward inference.
This is typical of a DOBS as it is formalized in (Johnson
& Shapiro 2000).
SNeBR The SNePS belief revision sub-system,
SNeBR (Martins & Shapiro 1988), is activated when
a derived proposition or a hypothesis is added to the
belief space, and it explicitly contradicts a pre-existing
belief. The following are examples of explicit contradic-
tions in SNePS:
• P and ~P
• P and ~(P ∨ Q)
but not
• Q and Q=>P and ~P
because, in this last case, P is only an implicit belief
and must be derived before that contradiction can be
detected.
The detection of an explicit contradiction is almost
instantaneous, even in a knowledge base with thousands
of nodes, due to the Uniqueness Principle (Maida &
Shapiro 1982), which states that no two SNePS terms
denote the same entity.
[Therefore an] explicit contradiction . . . in the be-
lief space, is easily recognized by the system be-
cause . . . the data structure representing P is di-
rectly pointed to by the negation operator in the
data structure representing ~P. (Shapiro & John-
son 2000)
The user has the option of letting the belief space re-
main inconsistent or activating a manual version of be-
lief revision to restore consistency. The latter is per-
formed by forming a minimally-inconsistent set of hy-
potheses, which can be made consistent upon the re-
moval of any one of its members. This set is the union
of the origin sets for the contradicting beliefs—multiple
origin sets for a belief result in multiple inconsistent sets
to be revised. For example: If the contradictory propo-
sitions P and ~P had one (α) and two (β and γ) origin
sets respectively, then there would be two minimally-
inconsistent sets formed for belief revision: (α ∪ β) and
(α ∪ γ).
After forming the inconsistent sets, SNeBR prompts
the user to remove at least one proposition from each
set to restore consistency. It is up to the user to de-
cide which beliefs should be removed (retracted, become
unasserted).
How SNeBR Adheres to Constraints 1 and
2
Adherence to Constraint 1 Because a SNePS be-
lief space is a DOBS, it can only claim consistency in
terms of not knowing of any contradictions. Immedi-
ately upon discovery of a contradiction, however, the
system activates SNeBR to restore consistency. There-
fore, the user always has the option to maintain consis-
tency “whenever possible”.
Adherence to Constraint 2 Although SNePS can-
not promise that all derivable beliefs are in the knowl-
edge base, it does derive a proposition upon query if
that proposition is derivable from the existing knowl-
edge base. Therefore, SNePS follows an altered version
of constraint 2: If a proposition can be derived from
the beliefs in the knowledge base, then the system will
produce it if it is asked for.
Previous Attempts at Ordering Beliefs and
AutoBR
The researchers described in this section chose to order
beliefs based on relative credibility as determined by the
user—i.e. the user decides which beliefs (or types of be-
liefs) are more credible than others. This not the only
way to order beliefs as “more important or entrenched,”
but, due to our interest in information fusion, this epis-
temic entrenchment is the way we, also, have chosen
to order our beliefs. To this end, any reference in this
paper to orderings of beliefs or sources should be as-
sumed to mean ordering based on credibility (unless
otherwise stated). This ordering was then used in the
implementation of automatic belief revision (autoBR)
which allowed the systems described to perform belief
revision without user interaction.
Cravo and Martins (Cravo & Martins 1993) intro-
duced an altered version of SNePS, called SNePSwD
(SNePS with Defaults), that incorporated default rea-
soning. It also offered automatic belief revision based
on ordering beliefs by credibility and specificity. The
system allowed the user not only to order beliefs but
to also order the orders. Ordering large amounts of in-
formation was tedious, however, and any new additions
required updating relevant orderings.
Ehrlich (Ehrlich 1995; Ehrlich & Rapaport 1997;
Rapaport & Ehrlich 2000) altered a version of SNeP-
SwD that had this ordering capability. She chose to
eliminate the laborious hand ordering by defining a
predetermined group of “knowledge categories,” with
a preset ordering. The category for a proposition was
added as another argument of the proposition. She then
ordered all her propositions based on the relative order
of their knowledge categories. Although this saved her
the manual ordering, there were several drawbacks: (a)
she had to predetermine the knowledge categories that
would be used, (b) no new ones could be added, and
(c) the ordering hierarchy of the categories was fixed.
Both Cravo and Martins and Ehrlich developed their
automatic belief revision processes (autoBR) to remove
hypotheses based on credibility orderings—adhering to
constraint 4. How to properly combine and weight both
constraints 3 and 4 remains an open topic in belief revi-
sion. Our initial attempt to combine and weight them
is detailed later.
Alterations to Aid Adherence to
Constraint 3
To minimize information loss, the total number of be-
liefs removed from the system during revision must be
considered. Removal of some belief, P, will also remove
any propositions that have P in all of their currently ac-
tive origin sets. The revised SNeBR system orders the
hypotheses in the inconsistent sets based on the number
of derived propositions that they support.
It is also possible to make multiple inconsistent sets
consistent with a single retraction in the case that a
hypothesis common to those sets is the one chosen for
removal. The revised system creates an ordered list of
the hypotheses based on how many of the minimally-
inconsistent sets they are in.
From these two orderings, two lists are formed: (a)
the hypotheses supporting the fewest number of derived
propositions, and (b) the hypotheses common to the
largest number of inconsistent sets. These two lists are
now considered during belief revision in the interest of
adherence to constraint 3.
Unlike belief spaces created by deductive closure, our
DOBS system builds beliefs as they are queried about,
thus we can consider those beliefs to be of high interest
to the user. This somewhat validates the connection
between the cardinality of a belief set and the informa-
tion it holds. Other researchers (Sims & Kucera 1998)
also choose culprits based on set cardinality combined
with credibility issues.
Our current approach to minimizing information loss
involves counting believed propositions without regard
to their internal form. For example, A and B∧C∧D are
each counted as one proposition, as are both Q(a) and
all(x)(P(x) => Q(x)), even thought the latter one of
each pair clearly ”encodes” more information. Espe-
cially in the context of a DOBS, it would be important
to try to assess the usefulness of a proposition in terms
of the number of other propositions that might in the
future be derived from it. We leave this assessment for
future work.
Epistemic Entrenchment Additions to
SNeBR
Sources and their information
As mentioned earlier, Ehrlich’s knowledge categories
have to be determined and ordered off-line before run-
ning the system. This, plus the source information be-
ing included in each proposition as additional argument,
forced a static treatment and implementation. Our re-
vised SNePS system uses meta-propositions to assign
sources, allowing dynamic source addition and order-
ing.
Problems with Source Information as an Added
Argument Representing the source information as
an additional argument of the predicates has several
problems associated with it. For example, if “Fran
is smart.” were represented as Smart(Fran), “The
prof says that Fran is smart.” could be represented
as Smart(Fran, Prof), and the problems are:
1. The source of Smart(Fran, Prof) cannot be re-
moved or changed without also removing or chang-
ing the belief that Fran is smart. Although
that might immediately be reintroduced with
Smart(Fran, Nerd), belief revision may have had to
be performed in the interim, wasting time and effort.
2. The proposition ~Smart(Fran, Sexist) might rep-
resent either the belief that the sexist is the source of
the information that Fran is not smart or the belief
that the sexist is not the source of the information
that Fran is smart. No matter which one it does
represent, there is no obvious way to represent the
other.
3. It is not clear how to ascribe a source to a rule, such
as all(x)(Grad(x) => Smart(x)).
Benefits of Source Information in a Meta-
Proposition Representing the source information
in a meta-proposition, is to represent it as a be-
lief about the belief. For example, “The prof says
that Fran is smart.” would be represented as
Source(Prof, Smart(Fran)).1 This solves the three
problems cited above:
1. The source of the belief that Fran is smart can be
removed or changed, without removing or chang-
ing the belief that Fran is smart, by remov-
ing Source(Prof, Smart(Fran)) without removing
Smart(Fran), and then, perhaps, introducing a dif-
ferent source, e.g. Source(Nerd, Smart(Fran)).
2. The belief that the sexist is the source of the in-
formation that Fran is not smart would be repre-
sented as Source(Sexist, ~Smart(Fran)), whereas
the belief that the sexist is not the source of the in-
formation that Fran is smart would be represented as
~Source(Sexist, Smart(Fran)).
3. The belief that the prof is the source of the rule
that all grads are smart would be represented by
Source(Prof, all(x)(Grad(x) => Smart(x))).
As shown, this allows dynamic interaction, where the
user can add, remove, and change source information
about a proposition while the system is running and
without affecting or entirely rewriting the actual propo-
sition. Source orderings are also stored as propositions,
such as Greater(Prof,Nerd), which can be interacted
with and reasoned about dynamically. New sources as
well as their credibility orderings can be added at any
time to the knowledge base. Propositions can even have
more than one source, although SNeBR assumes a sin-
gle source at this time.
1This is syntactically and semantically correct, because
propositions like Smart(Fran) are, in SNePS, functional
terms denoting propositions (Shapiro 1993).
Ordering Propositions (Epistemic
Entrenchment) and Sources
Our system currently depends on the user to determine
the credibility of sources or beliefs directly. The user
inputs information to the system declaring source cred-
ibility orders and/or belief credibility orders. These are
partial orders that are qualitative and transitive.
The system currently assumes beliefs have, at most,
one source, but future research will explore multiple
source situations and their implementation. We are
also assuming at this time that a more credible source
delivers more credible information. E.g. Given the fol-
lowing:
• Lisa is more credible than Bart.
• Lisa tells us, “It is snowing.”
• Bart tells us, “Homer is fat.”
we consider “It is snowing” more credible than “Homer
is fat.”
Since ordering can never be assumed complete or
unchangeable, the system works with what it has—
including propositions whose sources are unknown (as-
sumed at this time to be more credible than beliefs that
have recorded sources). An interesting issue to explore
in the future would be to have the system dynamically
establishing and adjusting source credibility informa-
tion based on revision experiences.
Recommendations and Automatic Belief
Revision
The user can set the belief revision mode at any time
from the top level of the SNePSLOG interface. The two
modes are:
manual offers recommendations, but requires the user
to revise (this is the default)
auto activates automatic belief revision, autoBR
From the union of all the inconsistent sets underlying
the contradiction, SNeBR produces three lists that are
used to create a recommended culprit list:
LB the least believed hypotheses
MC the hypotheses that are the most common (to the
largest number of inconsistent sets)
FS the hypotheses that support the fewest beliefs in
the knowledge base.
The first set provides possible culprits that support
constraint 4 (remove the least important or least credi-
ble beliefs). Both the second and the third sets will pro-
vide possible culprits that support constraint 3 (mini-
mal loss of information during belief revision). The
culprit list is created by combining these lists using a
method described in the next section.
Once the recommended culprit list is formed, the user
is notified of the three lists as well as the culprit list.
In manual mode, the user must then decide (with the
help of those lists) which hypotheses to remove from
the context. In auto mode, the system will perform an
automatic retraction if the culprit list contains a single
hypothesis. Otherwise it reverts to manual. In either
case, any unresolved inconsistencies are dealt with man-
ually.
Culprit List Algorithm
Processing the three lists above to create a culprit list
(CL) results in the smallest, non-empty intersection:
CL = Min − not − ∅((LB ∩MC ∩ FS), (LB ∩MC),
(LB ∩ FS), (MC ∩ FS), LB,MC,FS), where Min −
not−∅ is a function that chooses the smallest non-empty
set from a list of sets in decreasing order of importance
(for tie-breaking purpose—e.g. choose LB over MC).
Other factors being equal, removing a belief with
low credibility (constraint 4) is currently preferred over
one whose removal does the least damage (constraint
3), because credibility orders are not weakened by the
absence of deductive closure. Regarding the informa-
tion used to support constraint 3, the system prefers
to remove a more common belief over one with the
fewest supported nodes, because that will protect be-
liefs that have been derived in more ways. For ex-
ample, given A, B, D, A->C, B->C, and D->~C, and
the derivations of C (both ways) and ~C, the minimally
inconsistent sets would be {A, A->C, D, D->~C} and
{B, B->C, D, D->~C} and both D and D->~C would be
the most common hypotheses. Removal of either re-
sults in the loss of ~C and the retention of C, which was
derived two ways.
It should be emphasized, however, that the final de-
termination of CL is the smallest, non-empty set found.
In this sense, condition 3 regains some of its lost status.
For example: if (LB ∩ FS) contained three hypotheses
and (MC ∩ FS) contained two, the latter would be
chosen over the former, even though only the former
contained credibility information.
An edited sample of the autoBR output for a belief
revision exercise is available in Appendix 1.
Conclusion and Future Work
By considering the work of coherence and theoretical
researchers, we were able to improve our existing belief
revision system by adding information essential to im-
proving culprit selection during revision. The revised
system combines the constraints of minimal informa-
tion loss and maximal credibility in its development of
a culprit list during belief revision to return consistency
to a knowledge base. It considers (a) the number of hy-
potheses and derived propositions that will be affected
by the revision as well as (b) the relative credibility or-
derings of the hypotheses under consideration. These
orderings are determined by both source credibility or-
derings and credibility orders directly assigned between
hypotheses. All source and credibility information can
be retracted, altered, added to, and reasoned about
while the system is running.
Automatic belief revision is possible when the culprit
list contains a single hypothesis. In this case, the system
appears to the user to be non-monotonic: i.e. the user
can add a proposition to an existing context, but end up
with a belief space that is not a superset of the original
belief space.
The issue of incorporating source information and
credibility ordering into a knowledge base is key to
maintaining the credibility of an information fusion sys-
tem. Selection of a well-believed hypothesis as the cul-
prit (due to other considerations like minimizing dam-
age to the knowledge base) might also indicate a need
to re-evaluate the reliability of its source. This might
lead to development of a system that dynamically ad-
justs source and propositional credibility orders based
on past performance.
Work for the immediate future will include dealing
with (1) a proposition having multiple sources and (2)
revising the inconsistent sets as a group. For the lat-
ter, we might first partition the inconsistent sets based
on which of the contradictory nodes each hypothesis
supports (or if it supports both), then analyzing the
groups by their inconsistent set as well as by their par-
tition. Then the system could better determine which
of the contradictory nodes should be contracted and
remove its supports efficiently. We hope that one re-
sult will be an improvement on safe contraction (Al-
chourro´n & Makinson 1985). For example: If retracting
a proposition P with the two origin sets of {A,B,C} and
{B,D} ordered in increasing credibility, then retracting
the least-believed in each set (as per safe-contraction)
would remove both A and B, when removal of B would
be sufficient. This improvement might show up as the
union of the least believed and the most common sets.
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Appendix 1
Below is a description of the information given to the
knowledge base. WFF22 is added last with forward infer-
encing, which produces the contradictory propositions
that trigger SNeBR. The five sources with their credi-
bility orderings are:
Holybook > Prof WFF1: GREATER(HOLYBOOK,PROF)
Prof > Nerd WFF2: GREATER(PROF,NERD)
Nerd > Sexist WFF3: GREATER(NERD,SEXIST)
Fran > Nerd WFF4: GREATER(FRAN,NERD)
Source: statement
Nerd: Jocks aren’t smart.
WFF10: all(X)(JOCK(X) => (~SMART(X)))
WFF11: SOURCE(NERD,WFF10)
Sexist: Females aren’t smart.
WFF12: all(X)(FEMALE(X) => (~SMART(X)))
WFF13: SOURCE(SEXIST,WFF12)
Prof: Grads are smart.
WFF14: all(X)(GRAD(X) => SMART(X))
WFF15: SOURCE(PROF,WFF14)
HolyBook: Old people are smart.
WFF16: all(X)(OLD(X) => SMART(X))
WFF17: SOURCE(HOLYBOOK,WFF16)
Fran: I’m an old, female, jock who’s a grad.
WFF22: FEMALE(FRAN) and OLD(FRAN) and
GRAD(FRAN) and JOCK(FRAN)
WFF23: SOURCE(FRAN,WFF22)
The following code is an edited version of the system
output showing the inconsistencies found and the hy-
potheses removed through autoBR. Author’s comments
are in italics.
After all the information is in, one contradiction is
detected:
The contradiction involves the newly
derived proposition:
WFF24: SMART(FRAN)
and the previously existing proposition:
WFF25: ~SMART(FRAN)
To resolve the contradiction, SNePS Belief Revision
(SNeBR) analyzes the inconsistent set formed by the
union of the two Origin Sets for the contradictory
propositions:
(WFF16,WFF22) ∪ (WFF12,WFF22) =
(WFF22,WFF16,WFF12)
The three sets aiding culprit selection:
The least believed hypothesis:
(WFF12)
The most common hypotheses:
(WFF22 WFF16 WFF12)
The hypotheses supporting the fewest nodes:
(WFF12 WFF16)
The system informs the user of its decision:
I will remove the following node:
WFF12: all(X)(FEMALE(X) => (~SMART(X)))
The system continues reasoning and discovers the
same contradiction (derived in new ways):
The contradiction involves the newly
derived proposition:
WFF25: ~SMART(FRAN)
and the previously existing proposition:
WFF24: SMART(FRAN)
There are two known-to-be-inconsistent sets in the
context, now:
The following sets are known to be
inconsistent. To make the context
consistent, remove at least one hypothesis
from each of the sets:
(WFF22 WFF16 WFF10) (WFF22 WFF14 WFF10)
The three sets aiding culprit selection:
The least believed hypothesis:
(WFF10)
The most common hypotheses:
(WFF22 WFF10)
The hypotheses supporting the fewest nodes:
(WFF14 WFF10)
The system’s decision in this case:
I will remove the following node:
WFF10: all(X)(JOCK(X) => (~SMART(X)))
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